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n recent years, a number of leading industrial relations scholars, 
including Roy Adams, have endeavoured to link labour rights and 
human rights in an attempt to shift the debate about the nature of 
labour relations in the North American context.  Specifically, Adams and others 
have argued that workers should not be viewed as economic interests, but rather 
as bearers of fundamental human rights (Adams 2006; Macklem 2006; Compa 
2000, 2003, 2008; Swepston 2003; Gross 2003 and 1999; McIntyre and Bodah 2006; 
Friedman 2001). There is a certain appeal to the labour rights as human rights 
approach.  Indeed, the normative weight associated with human rights discourse 
in liberal democratic societies has made it a popular political tool for social 
movements looking to press their demands.    
 I
Adams is correct, in my view, to argue that adopting such an approach 
raises important questions about the relationship between domestic labour law 
and international obligations, and the manner by which governments in Canada 
ought to interpret the rights of workers. However, I have serious reservations 
about Adams’ larger argument about the practical application of a labour-rights-
as-human-rights agenda.  In this reply to Adams, I argue that the labour rights as 
human rights approach threatens to undermine class-based responses to 
neoliberal globalization by contributing to the depoliticization of the labour 
movement.  I assert that the workers’ rights as human rights approach tends to 
downplay or altogether ignore the material dimension of collective worker action 
and the central role of economic conflict in the employment relationship.  In a 
sense, the labour rights as human rights approach is flawed because it assumes 
that power flows from rights.  History has demonstrated that the opposite is true.   
Indeed, liberal human rights discourse does little to address the inequalities in 
wealth and power that polarize Canadian society along class lines.  By shifting 
the focus of the employment relationship towards a liberal human rights 
understanding of labour management relations, we undermine class-based 
approaches to advancing workers’ rights.   As such, the labour rights as human 
rights approach, although popular in both theory and discourse, is a potentially 
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dangerous strategy for a labour movement which continues to fight a defensive 
battle in an era of neoliberal globalization.   
 
UNIONS AND RIGHTS DISCOURSE 
 
From a labour union perspective, the United Food and Commercial 
Workers (UFCW) and the National Union of Public and General Employees 
(NUPGE) have been at the forefront of promoting the labour rights as human 
rights agenda in Canada.  Their campaign has highlighted Canada’s dismal 
record at the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Committee on Freedom 
of Association in a bid to embarrass governments into complying with 
international labour rights (Fudge 2005: 65). In 2007, the National Teachers’ 
Federation and the Canadian Professional Police Association joined these unions 
in calling on the federal and provincial governments to respect the right to 
organize and bargain collectively as elaborated by the ILO.  However, it is 
unclear whether these unions support the theoretical idea of workers’ rights as 
human rights, or their practical application as envisioned by Adams.   
In light of recent national and international developments related to the 
human rights status of collective bargaining, Adams urges the labour movement 
to re-examine the appropriateness of the exclusive-agent certification model used 
to extend collective bargaining rights in Canada.  Specifically, Adams advocates 
the development of a non-statutory unionism, characterized by independent, 
non-union, non-standard employee organizations operating alongside 
established labour unions.  In his most recent contribution to Just Labour Adams 
argues that “Unions need to come to grips with the legitimacy of such 
independent organizations and non-traditional procedures which, survey 
evidence indicates, many employees prefer over certified exclusive agent 
representation.”   He goes on to argue that “In a truly human rights-compliant 
system employees should be able to establish a broader range of organizations 
and those organizations should be able to negotiate the sort of arrangements they 
want with the employer.”  Adams correctly notes that most unions would likely 
oppose the development of these non-standard employee associations.  
However, he tends to underestimate the threat these organizations pose to the 
relative strength of the labour movement.  Not only are such organizations 
lacking the statutory strength of labour unions, but they are often organized at 
the behest of employers in attempt to dissuade unionization.  
Adams offers up the McMaster University Faculty Association as an 
example of a how a non- statutory, non-union employee association can 
effectively engage in a form of collective bargaining.  However, this example is 
somewhat disingenuous given the relative level of privilege enjoyed by 
university faculty vis-à-vis other groups of workers.  In short, university faculty 
is in no way representative of Canada’s existing or emerging labour force.  Even 
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within the university sector, the situation at McMaster is the exception rather 
than the rule in Ontario.  It is one of only a few non-union university faculty 
associations in the province.  The vast majority of university faculty associations 
across Canada are bona fide labour unions that engage in legally-binding 
collective bargaining. Most recently, in May 2006, members of the University of 
Guelph Faculty Association voted overwhelmingly to become a certified union, 
largely because the non-union employee association model, trumpeted by 
Adams, had proven inadequate in addressing the needs and concerns of faculty 
members.  Union density continues to grow in the university sector, and union 
decertification is almost unheard of in Canadian universities.  All of this suggests 
that Adams’ example of the McMaster University Faculty Association is both 
flawed and unrepresentative.  
And what about the right to strike?  According to Adams, “From a 
human rights perspective it is highly doubtful that effective denial of the right to 
strike to workers who prefer to organize in flexible, non-statutory formats meets 
international human rights standards.”  To be sure, the right of workers to strike 
is of equal importance to the right of workers to engage in collective bargaining.  
However, on this point, Adams seemingly abandons a consistent theoretical 
approach to the labour right as human rights model by constructing a set of 
exceptions to justify encroachments on the right to strike.  His recent musings on 
the CAW-Magna deal are illustrative of this point.  In 2007, the CAW raised the 
ire of the Canadian labour movement by entering into a much-publicized 
agreement with Magna International which involved, among other things, 
having the union give up its right to strike in return for a card-check neutrality 
agreement with Magna.   In an editorial piece, Adams accused critics of the 
CAW-Magna deal of “overreacting” in condemning the deal as a paternalistic 
affront to workers’ rights.  Although Adams has argued that the right to strike is 
“a fundamental human right”, he has also made specific exceptions for workers 
who deliver “truly essential” services and for workers, like those at Magna, who 
willingly give up their right to strike.   In Adams’ own words, “Independent, 
binding arbitration is not an ideal way to settle contract disputes. But it is not a 
total sellout either.”  (Adams 2007, Straightgoods.ca) How these exceptions 
conform to Adams’ definition of fundamental human rights1 is unclear at best.   
 
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
 
Although early judicial decisions in the field of labour law tended to 
favour an individualistic view of rights and freedoms, at the expense of 
fundamental collective rights for workers, the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent 
and more generous interpretation of labour rights in the Charter has renewed 
interest in the relationship between workers’ rights and human rights. 
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Adams has argued that the Supreme Court of Canada has taken 
important steps in recent years to bring the Charter’s guarantee of Freedom of 
Association more in line with international norms established by the 
International Labor Organization.  In Dunmore v. Ontario (2001), the Court struck 
down an Ontario law which prohibited agricultural workers from organizing 
into unions.   The decision established that agricultural workers had a 
constitutionally protected right to organize under section 2(d) of the Charter.  In 
coming to this conclusion, the Court determined that a union’s collective 
activities may be central to freedom of association even though they are 
inconceivable on the individual level, and that the vulnerability of agricultural 
workers must be taken into consideration in assessing the scope of freedom of 
association. The Court also placed a great deal of emphasis on Canada’s 
international obligations to the ILO in arriving at its decision (Burkett 2003: 265). 
According to some unions, the decision in Dunmore effectively opened the door 
to the ILO as a body of reference for understanding how to interpret the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association freedom in a labour context 
(NUPGE 2003).  
In a creative anti-union response to the Court’s decision in Dunmore, the 
Progressive Conservative provincial government enacted Bill 137— the 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act, which gave the province’s agricultural 
workers the right to form unions, but not the right to bargain collectively or to 
strike.  The UFCW challenged the constitutional validity of the new law, but the 
Ontario Superior Court ruled in January 2006 that Bill 137 did not violate the 
Charter because it provided agricultural workers with adequate protection of 
their right to freedom of association.  The union subsequently appealed the 
decision and the case is currently making its way through the system.  The 
Ontario government’s response the Dunmore case points to the limits of the 
workers’ rights as human rights approach in an era of neoliberalism.   
In January 2002, the right-wing Liberal government of Premier Gordon 
Campbell enacted Bill 29, a law which allowed for hospital closures and 
extensive privatization of the province’s healthcare system.  In terms of labour 
relations, the Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act radically altered 
labour relations in the province’s healthcare system by invalidating some 
provisions of existing collective agreements and by precluding bargaining on 
several aspects of the employment relationship (BC Health Services 2007). The 
Hospital Employees Union (HEU) responded with an unsuccessful grassroots 
mobilization that included the threat of a general strike (which ultimately was 
never pursued). The union simultaneously pursued a legal strategy, filing a 
complaint with the ILO and launching a Charter challenge to Bill 29 on the 
grounds that the law violated the Charter’s equality provisions and guarantee of 
Freedom of Association. 
Savage   72 
In March 2003, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association upheld 
the HEU’s complaint, but the BC government essentially ignored this ruling.  In 
typical Canadian fashion, BC Premier Gordon Campbell simply stated that his 
government would not be swayed by the ILO’s findings, affirming further, “I feel 
no pressure whatsoever. I was not participating in any discussion with the UN” 
(Steffenhagen  2003). Despite the government’s decision to ignore the ILO’s 
findings, the HEU continued to pursue its legal strategy. 
Several months after the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association 
passed judgment on Bill 29, the union’s Charter challenge was rejected by a lower 
court based on jurisprudence which held that freedom of association did not 
protect the right to bargain collectively.  The lower court also rejected the union’s 
claim that Bill 29 violated the Charter’s equality rights provision (BC Health 
Services 2003). The HEU appealed the ruling, but the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal upheld the trial judge’s ruling. Undeterred, the union appealed its case to 
the Supreme Court of Canada, which finally rendered a decision in June 2007. 
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court struck down several sections 
of British Columbia’s Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act.  In 
reversing previous jurisprudence, the Court relied partially on international law, 
arguing that “s. 2(d) of the Charter [Freedom of Association] should be 
interpreted as recognizing at least the same level of protection” as is found in 
ILO Convention 87, dealing with the right to collective bargaining (BC Health 
Services 2007: 438; 79).   
However, contrary to Adams’ assertions, the Court was careful not to 
fully embrace the ILO’s conception of freedom of association.  It is here where 
the lines between Canada’s international commitments and its domestic labour 
laws have become severely blurred from the perspective of workers’ rights as 
human rights. Indeed, the Court suggested that the Charter only protects certain 
aspects of collective bargaining in certain contexts.  In essence, the decision 
protects unions from substantial government interference with the process of 
collective bargaining without taking into consideration any of the objectives 
sought by the parties involved in negotiations.  Although the decision makes 
clear that governments have a duty to bargain in good faith, there is nothing to 
stop a determined anti-union employer from rolling back union rights and 
freedoms in existing collective agreements, provided such roll-backs come at the 
conclusion of a process of consultation with the union.   That is because it is the 
process, not the outcome of bargaining, that is protected by the Charter.  At best, 
the BC Health Services decision will likely force anti-union governments to rethink 
their overzealous approach to labour relations, but it does very little to prevent 
them from pursuing explicitly anti-union agendas, which would include the 
continued erosion of collective bargaining rights.  It should also be noted that the 
BC Health Services decision does not guarantee the right to strike (BC Health 
Services 2007: 411;19).  
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Although the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in BC Health Services 
drew upon international labour rights and standards in order to justify extending 
constitutional protection to collective bargaining, it is important not to overstate 
the decision’s impact on labour relations.  In re-affirming  the public policy 
environment of the post-war compromise, the Court has done little to advance 
the interests of workers. Indeed, the fact that organized labour must rely on the 
courts, rather than the legislatures, to protect the last vestiges of the post-war 
compromise is a sad commentary on the political clout of unions in an era of 
neoliberalism.  As such, the decision in BC Health Services showcases organized 
labour’s weakness, not its strength.  More importantly, as Eric Tucker has 
argued, “if judicial protection of workers’ collective rights is premised on a view 
of unions as victims, it suggests that the moment that courts perceive unions to 
be powerful actors they will find ways to limit the rights they have recognized” 
(Tucker 2008).  
 
WHICH WAY FORWARD FOR LABOUR? 
 
Given the result of recent Supreme Court decisions, does the agenda of 
workers’ rights as human rights represent a practical strategic path forward for 
organized labour?  Adams’ specific proposals, which revolve around the 
development of a tripartite consensus and codetermination, seemingly do not 
conform to the priorities of business, labour, or the state.  The Canadian 
government, for its part, refuses to sign on to ILO Convention 98, which protects 
the right to collective bargaining. Employer groups are openly hostile to Adams’ 
conception of labour rights, while organized labour is suspicious at best. Also, 
Adams readily admits that influential organizations like Amnesty International 
Canada and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association have largely ignored the 
perceived human rights gap in Canadian labour relations. As such, he will likely 
find it incredibly difficult to muster much support for his particular vision of 
labour rights as human rights.   These considerations aside, Adams’ proposals 
threaten to undermine the capacity of unions to build a movement which 
challenges the boundaries of liberal democracy.  Extending collective bargaining 
rights is a laudable concept.  However, workers in Canada are unlikely to realize 
that goal unless the labour movement is prepared to redouble its efforts in three 
key areas. 
 
ORGANIZE THE UNORGANIZED 
 
Most unions in Canada continue to devote only a scant amount of 
resources towards organizing new workers.  Although increasing union 
membership does not directly translate into greater union power, it does unleash 
greater potential power for individual unions and the labour movement as a 
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whole.  Particular attention needs to be paid to the private sector, where union 
density levels have dipped below 20%.   Organizing precarious part-time 
workers in the service sector is not impossible, but does require a long-term 
strategic vision and plan involving multiple unions.  Extending collective 
bargaining rights to workers through any number of non-statutory schemes is no 
replacement for organizing workers into real unions.   
 
CONTESTING NEOLIBERALISM 
 
A right-wing political project born out of the demise of the post-war 
compromise in the mid 1970s, neoliberalism, characterized in the public policy 
sphere by fiscal austerity, free trade, tax cuts, privatization, contracting out, 
restrictions on workers’ rights, and eroded democratic institutions, has been 
embraced by governments of all political stripes in Canada.  Organized labour 
must accept that Canada and its corporate elites are not victims of neoliberal 
globalization, but rather agents of neoliberal globalization.  Only then can unions 
begin a process of challenging neoliberal restructuring in a way that is both 
meaningful and effective – by viewing their struggle as separate and distinct 
from the interests of business. (McBride, 2005)  
 
RESISTING THE “LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS” 
 
In recent years, Canadian unions have increasingly come to embrace 
what Michael Mandel refers to as “legalized politics” (Mandel 1994). Rather than 
focus their resources on political struggles against hostile politicians and anti-
union employers, Canadian unions have, to some degree, retreated to legal 
institutions as an alternative strategy.   
 Labour’s strategic shift towards embracing judicial rights discourse as a 
political strategy is unquestionably linked to its unprecedented post-war 
weakness.  While Adams has uncritically celebrated the Supreme Court decisions 
in Dunmore and BC Health Services as a victory for labour rights as human rights, 
others have been far more cautious in interpreting the Court’s new direction.   
Labour lawyers Valerie Matthews Lemieux and Steven Barrett (who acted as co-
counsel for the Canadian Labour Congress in the BC Health Services case) have 
adopted a carefully nuanced analysis of the BC Health Services decision, arguing 
that the future impact of the case “will depend on the extent to which future 
courts take an unduly narrow reading of the decision as simply imposing a mere 
consultation requirement on governments before overriding collective 
bargaining rights, or more fulsomely and purposively view the decision as 
requiring governments to truly respect good faith bargaining by respecting 
negotiated collective agreements and avoiding legislation which limits the scope 
of bargaining.” More importantly, Matthews Lemieux and Barrett concede that 
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“the labour movement should not lose sight of the ongoing need for organizing 
and mobilizing concerted political action and the development of political 
alliances, which have proven over time to be more effective than reliance on the 
courts to advance labour rights and freedoms.” (Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives Review, Labour Notes December 2007, “Charter Protection Extended 
to Collective 
Bargaining – How Far Does it Reach?” ) 
Historically, collective political action has been organized labour’s 
favoured and most successful vehicle for progressive change.    Indeed, workers 
struggled and in some cases died to secure recognition of trade union rights.  A 
new focus on a legalistic brand of rights discourse, which privileges legal 
institutions like the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association and the 
Supreme Court of Canada, threatens to undermine collective political responses 
to neoliberal assaults on trade union rights and freedoms.   Although promoting 
labour rights as human rights has yielded symbolic victories along the way, it 
has done very little to change the balance of class forces in Canada.  And 
although the recent BC Health Services decision proved that the Charter does have 
some progressive potential in the realm of labour law, at its core the Charter 
remains firmly committed to the principles of liberal rather than socialist 
democracy.  In the end, no constitutional document or international treaty, 
however progressive, can replace the need for sustained political struggle to 
protect and enhance workers’ rights.   Indeed, by buying into a liberal notion of 
human rights, labour may end up undermining class-based political responses 
aimed at addressing the vast disparities in wealth and power that exist in 
advanced capitalist countries. 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1.  Adams defines a human right as “a right possessed by all human beings simply as a result of their 
being human.  Such rights may neither be granted nor be taken away by governments.  They are 
considered to be superior to rights established by statute.”  (Adams 2006, 135) 
